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THE FISCAL OR TAX YEAR IN MISSOURI.
In 1892 the St. Louis Court of Appeals decided' that the phrase
"taxable year of 1890" meant the year beginning on June 1, 1889,
and ending May 31, 1890. The question arose upon a supplemental
agreement to a lease of land for a term beginning May 15, 1890,
whereby the parties agreed that "the entire tax for the year 1890,
shall be paid by the lessor and lessees in the proportion that each of
said parties has had possession of said premises during the taxable
year of 1890, it being taken that the lessees have had possession
since the fifteenth day of May 1890." The lessor con-
tended that the phrase "taxable year of 1890" should be construed to
mean the calendar year of 1890, which would make the lessees liable for
15/24 of the taxes; while the lessees contended that the phrase meant
a fiscal or taxable year ending on June 1, 1890, so that they were
liable for only 1/24 of the taxes. The Court sustained the contention
of the lessees, holding that sections 7552 and 7569 of the Rev.
Statutes of Missouri of 1889 dearly establish what may be desig-
nated as a taxable or fiscal year, beginning on the first day of June
in each year, and that the Supreme Court had recognized that fact in
several early cases
Only two years before that decision, the same court, composed
of the same judges, had occasion to construe a statute which provided
that no person should be eligible for the office of director of public
schools "who shall have not paid a tax within said city for two con-
secutive years immediately preceeding his election ;" and it held that
"when reference is made to taxes for two consecutive years imme-
diately preceding an election, the term has reference to the caledar
years preceding the year in which the election takes place s
1. De Giverville v. Legg, 48 Mo. App. 573.
2. Glasgow v. Rowse, 43 Mo. 479; McLaren v. Sheble, 45 Mo. 130.
3. State ex reL v. Macklin, 41 Mo. App. 335.
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It is apparent that these cases involved precisely the same question
notwithstanding in the De Giverville case the court attempted to justify
its decision on the ground that, in the Mackl;i case, "it did not de-
cide that for assessment purposes there could not be a taxable year."
Probably the stronger reason for disregarding its decision in the
Macklin case was that, in the meantime, the Supreme Court had
decided' that the Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction in the Macklin
case, wherefore the opinion and judgment in that case had no binding
force.
The precise question decided in the DeGivervil!e case has not again
come before any of the appellate courts, so that the decision in that
case stands as the law of Missouri, unless it is in conflict with con-
trolling decisions of the Supreme Court, although it seems palpably
unsatisfactory and inconclusive, in view of the general scheme for
the assessment and taxation of property established by our revenue
acts, and, indeed, is demonstrably erroneous.
So far as it affects the construction of covenants providing for
the payment of taxes, the question whether the rule laid down in the
De Giverville case is right or otherwise is, perhaps, now of little
consequence, inasmuch as parties making such covenants can and of
course will so frame their covenants as to conform to that decision.
But there is an important class of cases in which the interested parties
cannot conform their actions and the circumstances to the rule there
laid down, and hence are vitally interested in having the question
rightly determined. Upon the termination of every life estate in real
or personal property, the question arises whether the estate of the
deceased life-tenant, or the remainder-man, is liable for accruing
taxes, and the answer depends upon the correct determination of
what the tax year really is.
It will be observed, too, that the rule announced in the DeGiver-
yile case, if it be the law, offers a ready, though temporary, solu-
tion of the State's financial embarrassment, which the legislature
may easily avail itself of, as the taxes under existing law are not
collected until six months, and do not become delinquent until seven
months, after expiration of the year for which the De Giverville case
holds they are levied. In other words, as, at the time a year's taxes
are received in the treasury, seven-twelfths of the next year's taxes
have already accrued, by so amending the statutes relating to the col-
lection of the revenue as to provide for its collection within the year
for which it is levied, and changing the fiscal year to correspond to
4. State ex rel. Macklin v. Rombaner, 104 Mo. 619.
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such tax year, the state and county treasuries would be enriched in
an amount equal to seven-twelfths of the total taxes for the year in
which the change took place.
The decision in the De Giverville case was put upon the ground
that Sections 7552 and 7569,s Revised Statutes Mo., 1889, "establish
what may be designated as a taxable or fiscal year beginning on the
first day of June in each year." The court quoted from two early
decisions of the Supreme Court "only to show that the courts of the
state have recognized that, for the purpose of assessment, there is
such a thing as a taxable year, and that it is definitely fixed by
statute."
While it may be conceded that the language quoted from the early
Supreme Court opinions lends color to the conclusion reached by the
Court of Appeals, the facts actually in judgment in those cases do
not necessarily bear out that language. Glasgow v. Rowes arose
under an act imposing a tax on certain incomes, section three of which
provided that the tax should be assessed upon the amount of salary
or income received in the year next preceding the time of assessment
of the tax. Under instructions from the auditor the assessment in
question was made for the year from April 1, 1864, to March 31, 1865.
The Court held that the auditor exceeded his authority in designat-
ing a year beginning on April first, inasmuch as the Legislature
intended the tax year under said act to coincide with the tax year as
established by the general revenue act then in force; but it did not
expressly say what the tax year was. The court did, however, say
that section 3 of the act under consideration "was in entire har-
mony with the then existing revenue law, which provided that the
taxes collected for any year should be based on an assessment
made for the previous year." This seems a clear recognition of the
fact that under the general revenue law the assessment upon which
5. Section 7552: Real Estate shall be assessed at the assessme:nt which
shall commence on the first day of June. 1881. and shall only be required
to be assessed every two years thereafter. Each assessment of real estate
so made shall be the basis of taxation on the same for two years next suc-
ceeding.
Section 7569: Every person owning or holding property on the first day
of June, including all such property purchased on that day, shall be liable
for taxes thereon for the ensuing year.
These sections first appear in the act of March 30, 1872 (Laws of Mo.,
Adj. Session 1871, sec. 48, page 92, and sec. 60, page 95), where the date spec-
ified is August first. They were amended so as to read June first in 1881
(page 178 Laws of Mo. 1881), and have not since been amended except that
in 1893 the former was so amended as to require the annual assessment of
real estate. They are now sections 11371 and 11338, Rev. Stat. Mo. 1909.
6. Glasgow v. Rowse, 43 Mo. 479.
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the property taxes were then based was made, or, to be exact, com-
menced in the year preceding that for which the tax was levied. As at
that time the assessment of property began on the first Monday in Sep-
tember of each year,1 the tax there under consideration should, under
the theory of the De Giverville case, have been levied upon incomes
which accrued from the first Monday in September, 1864, to the first
Monday of September, 1865; but the above quotation from the court's
opinion shows beyond question that the court did not so under-
stand the law.
The question presented in McLaren v. Sheble,6 the other case
cited in the De Giverville opinion, was as to the liability of a grantor
on his covenat of warranty made October 1, 1866, for taxes based
upon an assessment which began on the first Monday of September,
1866, and it was ruled, upon the authority of Blossom v. Van
Court,$ that the taxes were a lien upon the land from the com-
mencement of the assessment and, hence, the covenant had been
breached. That disposed of the question presented for decision,
but unfortunately the Court went on to say that the grantor "was
liable for the taxes of the fiscal year beginning at that date" (first
Monday of September, 1866). The statement that the fiscal year
commenced on the first Monday of September was not justified
by anything said or decided in Blossom vs. Van Court, and was in
direct contravention of the statute, which had been in force for many
years, defining the fiscal year as beginning on the first of October
and ending on September thirtieth of each year.10
Even if it be assumed that the Court inadvertently used the term
"fiscal year" to indicate the tax year, and that it intended to say that
the tax year then began with the beginning of the assessment, on the
first Monday of September, an examination of the several revenue acts
in force from time to time, from 1855 on, shows beyond doubt that
the court misconstrued the law in so holding, and that in 1866, as well
as before and after that time, the tax year corresponded with the
calendar year.
Under the Statutes of 1855, the assessment of property for pur-
poses of taxation began on the first day of February in each year, and
every person who owned or had charge of any taxable property on
that day was required to deliver a list thereof to the assessor. The
assessor returned the tax book, showing his valuation of property, to
7. G. S. Mo. 1865, p. 100, Sec. 10.
8. McLaren v. Sheble, 45 Mo. 130.
9. Blossom v. Van Court, 34 Mo. 390.
10. G. S. Mo. 1865, p. 86, Sec. 11; 2 R. S. Mo. 1855, p. 1540, Sec. 2.
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the County Court on or before July first each year, and at its next
term that Court heard and determined all appeals from the assessor's
valuations. When the assessments had been so corrected and the
amount of the county tax stated therein, the County court caused the
tax book to be delivered to the collector who at once proceeded to
collect the taxes. The collector was required to make a list of taxes
he was unable to collect, called the delinquent list, and post a copy
thereof at the court house door at least ten days prior to the third
Monday in December, and to return the delinquent list to the County
Court on the third Monday in December, and to settle his accounts of
all moneys received by him for taxes at the term of the County Court
which cormmenced on the third Monday of December.-
Thus the proceedings were commenced and wholly concluded,
including the collection of the tax, within eleven months of one cal-
endar year; and it is obvious that the tax so collected was a tax for
that calendar year in which the proceedings were had.
In 1857 a new revenue act was enacted under which the assess-
ment still commenced on February first of each year, and the tax
was levied, assessed and collected, or declared delinquent, prior to
January first following." Here again the tax was unquestionably
levied for the calendar year in which the proceedings took place.
By act of March 27, 1861,11 the assessment was made to begin on
September first in each year, but the assessor did not return the tax
book to the County Court until on or before the first day of Feb-
ruary following, and that court heard appeals from the assessor's
valuations on and after the third Monday in February. The county
clerk was required, within ninety days after the correction and
adjustment of the tax book, to make and deliver a copy thereof to
the collector, who then proceeded to collect the tax; and he was
required to post and return to the County Court at its term begin-
ning on the third Monday in November, a delinquent list of taxes he
could not collect.
Under this act the assessment began on September first in one
year, and was completed and the tax levied and collected in the fol-
lowing year. Did the Legislature thereby intend to change the tax
year from the Calendar year to a year beginning on September first
and ending the following August thirty-first? If so, would they not
have provided that taxes unpaid on August thirty-first were delin-
11. 2 R. S. Mo. 1855, p. 1329, sec. 18; p. 1334, Sec. 49; p. 1335, Sec. 50; p.
1341, Sec. 20; p. 1345. Sec. 40. 41.
12. Laws Mo. 1857, p. 75 et seq.
13. Laws Mo. 1860, p. let et seq.
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quent and subject to interest and penalties after that date? The fact
that the tax did not become delinquent until the third Monday in
November, nearly three months later, is in itself sufficient to show
that no change in the tax year was intended. But that is not all.
The last section of the act" provides that it should take effect
from and after August first, 1861, "provided, that its requirements
shall not apply to the assessment and collection of the revenue for the
year 1861, but the several officers having charge thereof shall pro-
ceed with and complete the same under the provisions of the laws in
force at the date of the passage of this act." And under each of
the acts mentioned, the tax levied was expressly declared an annual
tax.15
So that in 1861 two assessments of property for taxation were
commenced, one on February first, under the Act of 1857; the
other on September first, under the Act of 1861. If, then, the tax
year begins with the inception of the assessment, as was intimated in
the McLaren case and decided in the De Giverville case, the result of
the Act of 1861 was to subject property to two annual taxes during
the period from February 1, 1861, to September 1, 1862-a result
certainly not contemplated by the Legislature.
By an Act of the Adjourned Session of 1863,0 the assessment
began on the first Monday of September of each year, except in the
County of St. Louis, where it began on the first day of September.
The collector returned the delinquent list to the court on the third
Monday of December in the following year. By express provision the
tax levied was annual one. If the taxable year commences with the
assessment, the curious anomaly was here presented of the tax year
for the County of St. Louis differing from that of the rest of the
State. This was, however, corrected in 1865 by requiring the asses-
ment to begin everywhere on the first Monday in September? T
The act of March 18, 1870,1 provided that "the assessment of
real estate made for the year 1870 shall be the assessment thereof
until the first Monday in July, 1871, between which last named time
and the first day of October next thereafter, and in like time every
two years thereafter, all real estate subject to taxation shall be
aSSeSsed."
14. Laws Mo. 1860, p. 75, sec. 9.
15. 2 R. S. Mo. 1855. p. 1324, Sec. 5; Laws Mo. 1857, p. 76, Sec. 4; Laws
Mo. 1860, p. 63, Sec. 6.
16. Laws Mo. Adj. Session 1863, p. 68, Sec. 7; p. 73, Sec. 51; p. 80, Sec.
38; p. 66, Sec. 4.
17. G. S. Mo. 1865, p. 100, Sec. 10.
18. Laws Mo. 1870, p. 114, Sec. 1.
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By the Act of March 30, 1872,3 the assessor was required to
list all taxable property between the first days of August and January,
and to return his assessment to the County Court on or before Jan-
uary twentieth each year. The County Board of Equalization met
on the first Monday of April to correct the assessor's valuations and
to hear appeals therefrom. Unpaid taxes became delinquent on the
following January first, i. e., the second January first after the begin-
ning of the assessment. In this Act first appear those provisions
upon which the decision in the De Giverville case is based, the only
difference being that the dates specified here are the first day of
August instead of first day of June."
The Act of March 24, 1881,21 provided that the assessment of
property should begin on June first of each year, instead of August
first, and the former date was also substituted for August first in those
sections of the Act of 1872, which subsequently became sections 7552
and 7569 of the Revised Statutes of 1889. This Act of 1881 is still
in force, and has not since been amended in any of its essential fea-
tures, except that in 1893 it was provided that thereafter real estate
should be assessed annually instead of biennially.
All of the aforesaid acts in express terms provided for the levy
of an annual tax, and the State Constitution ot 1875 prescribes the
maximum annua rates that may be levied for county, school and
municipal purposes.22
It is clear from the express terms of all the aforesaid acts pro-
viding for the assessment and levy of an annual tax only, that the
Legislature, by advancing the date for the commencement of the
assessment of property in the Acts of 1861, 1872 and 1881, did not
intend to shift the tax year so as to make it begin with the assessment,
since the result would have been to levy something other than an
annual tax in those years. What, then, was the object of so advancing
from time to time the date on which the assessment should begin? The
answer is apparent: it was for the purpose of giving the assessors
and county courts or boards of equalization more time in which to
make and correct and adjust the assessment. The fact that suc-
cessive changes were made, and at long intervals of time during which
the State was being rapidly settled, indicates that as the reason for
the changes. As to the final change in 1881, that must be true, inas-
19. Laws Mo. Adj. Session 1871, p. 89, Sec. 28; p. 95, Sec. 62; p. 87,
Sec. 14; p. 95, Sec. 63; p. 106, Sec. 116.
20. Ib. p. 92, Sec. 48; p. 95, Sec. 60.
21, Laws Mo. 1881, p. 178.
22. Const. Mo. 1875, Art X, Sec. 11.
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much as the Legislature, because of the constitutional provision
adopted in 1875, at that time had no power to levy the prescribed
annual rates for a shorter period than a year. That constitutional
linitation would necessarily prevent such an interpretation of the sec-
tions of the Act of 1881 relied upon by the court in the DeGiverville
case, as was there given them. Conceding that prior to 1875 the Legis-
lature had power, by shifting the tax year, to assess and levy taxes for
shorter periods than a year, did it exercise that power by the Act of
1872, in which appear for the first time the provisions relied upon in
the De Giverville case? Even if it were true that the Legislature by
that act did so intend, and the act be construed so as to effectuate that
intent, still the decision in the De Giverville case was wrong, and the
tax year in Missouri remains as established by the Act of 1872, i. e.,
as beginning on August first and ending on July thirty-first, because the
legislatur, had no power in 1881 to levy a tax for a shorter period
than a year, either by shifting the tax year, or by any other means.
As before stated, the fact that the tax levied under the Act of
1872 was in express terms an annual tax, and not a tax for a fraction
of a year, clearly negatives any intention on the part of the Legislature
to shift the tax year by the provision requiring the assessment to be
commenced on August first. Hence the tax year must be held to have
remained as it was before that act, unless the provisions thereof which
afterwards became sections 7552 and 7569 of the Revised Statutes of
1889 must be construed as having shifted the tax year by force of their
express terms. There is, however, nothing in the language of those
sections which necessitates a construction at variance with the intent
to be gathered from the other provisions of the act. On the contrary,
under the statutory rule that the word "year" is to be construed, in all
statutes, to mean a calendar year, unless otherwise expressed in the
statute to be construed,21 those sections are in entire harmony with the
other provisions of the act, and but emphasize what is already suffi-
ciently clear, viz.: that no change in the tax year was contemplated.
That rule requires those sections to be read thus: "Real Estate shall be
assessed at the assessment which shall commence on the first day of
August, 1872, (since 1881, first day of June, 1881.) ... Each assess-
ment of real estate so made shall be the basis of taxation on the same
for two calendar years next succeeding." And "Every person owning
or holding property on the first day of August (or by Act of 1881, first
day of June) . . shall be liable for taxes thereon for the ensuing
23. G. S. Mo. 1865, p. 83, Sec. 6; 2 R. S. Mo. 1889, Sec. 6570; 2 R. S. Mo.
1909, Sec. 8057.
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caendar year." It is thus apparent that the real fallacy of the Court
of Appeals in the DeGiverville case was in the failure to apply to
said sections the statutory definition of the word "year" as used in
those sections.
Certain other considerations inevitably lead to the conclusion that
the tax year in Missouri is the calendar year next after the beginning
of an assessment, and not the year beginning with such assessment
Until 1855 there seems to have been no statutory definition of the
term "fiscal year," but by the Revised Statutes of that year, the fiscal
year of the State is defined as beginning on the first day of October in
each year and ending on September thirtieth of the following year. "
That continued to be the fiscal year until 1868, when the fiscal year
was defined as beginning on January first and ending on December
thirty-first in each year."s Why was that change made? It is a fair
assumption that the Legislature intended thereby to make the fiscal
year coincide with the tax year, which, as we have shown, is the calen-
dar year. But whether that be so or not, the Constitution of 1875
introduced into the fundamental law a new provision, which requires
for its proper enforcement that the fiscal and tax years of the State
shall coincide. If, as was held in the DeGiverville case, the tax year
begins on June first and ends on May thirty-first following, it became
the duty of the Legislature, because of said Constitutional provision
to re-define the fiscal year to make it correspond with such tax year.
The fact that it has not done so in the forty-four years that have
elapsed since that provision became part of our organic law, would
seem convincing that it regarded the tax year as corresponding with
the fiscal or calendar year under the existing revenue laws.
The present constitution provides that "no county, city, town,
township school district or other political corporation or subdivision
of the state shall be allowed to become indebted in any manner or
for any purpose to an amount exceeding in any year the income and
revenue provided for such year without the assent of two-thirds of
the voters thereof voting at an election to be held for that purpose.'6
The preceding section prescribes the maximum tax rates that may
be levied annually for county, city, town and school purposes respec-
tively, without a vote of the people.
Our Supreme Court has said of those provisions: "The evi-
dent purpose of the framers of the constitution and the people
who adopted it was to abolish in the administration of county and
24. 2 R. S. Mo. 1855, p. 1540; Sec. 2; G. S. Mo. 1865, p. 86, Sec. 11.
25. Laws of Mo. 1868, p. 178.
26. Constitution Mo. 1875, Art X, Secs. 12 and 11.
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municipal government, the credit system and establish the cash system
by limiting the amount of tax which might be imposed by a county
for county purposes, and limiting the expenditures in any given year to
the amount of revenue which such tax would bring into the treasury
for that year. Section 12 (Art. X) is clear and explicit on this
point. Under this section the county court might anticipate the reve-
nue collected, for any given year, and contract debts for ordinary
current expenses, which would be binding on the county to the
extent of the revenue provided for that year, but not in excess ofit.,,21
Although the Supreme Court held these constitutional restrictions
to be self-enforcing and not to require legislative action to effectuate
them,2s the Legislature in 1879 amended the then existing statutes
prescribing the order in which county warrants should be paid, to
conform to Section 12 of Article X, by adding thereto the following:
"Provided, however, that no warrant issued on account of any debt
incurred by any county other than those issued on account of the
ordinary and usual expenses of the county, shall be paid until all war-
rants issued for money due from the county on account of services
that are usual, and for all expenses necessary to maintain the county
organization for any one year, shall have been fully paid and liqui-
dated."'
It is quite obvious that the expen:;es incurred and indebtedness
created by a county court must be gaged and measured by the identical
year or period of time for which the income and revenue is provided,
in order to enforce and give due effect to the constitutional and
statutory restrictions. If the tax year or year for which the revenue
from taxation is provided begins on June first and ends on May
thirty-first following, that same period of time becomes necessarily
the measure of the expenses and indebtedness created by the county.
On the other hand, if the revenue from taxation is provided from
the calendar year, the calendar year must likewise be the basis for
calculating the current expenses and indebtedness created. It is
impossible to escape the conclusion that the tax year and the fiscal year
of the counties and other municipal subdivisions of the State must
correspond, if effect is to be given to the constitutional restriction.
Our Supreme Court has several times had occasion to examine
the question as to what twelve months' period is to be taken as the
27. Book v. Earl, 87 Mo. L c. 252.
28. St. Joseph Board of Public Schools v. Patten, 62 Mo. 444.
29. R. S. Mo. 1879, Sec. 5370; R. S. Mo. 1889, Sec. 3166; R. S. Mo. 1899,
Sec. 6771; R. S. Mo. 1909, Sec. 3758.
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measure of the expenses incurred and indebtedness created by a
county without the sanction of a vote by the people, and, after full
and repeated examination and consideration thereof, has decided
that the statute above referred to, which defines the fiscal year as
beginning on January first and ending on December thirty-first, applies
as well to the fiscal operations of the counties and other municipal
subdivisons of the state as to the state itself, and fixes the calendar
year as the fiscal year for all subdivisions of the state.30
In the first of these cases, Wilson v. Knox County, the warrant
sued upon was not in excess of the revenue provided and was. there-
fore, valid, if the fiscal year of the county ran from January first to
December thirty-first, but would have been invalid under the con-
stitutional provision, if, as the County contended, the fiscal year ran
from March to March following. The court in banc, all the judges
concurring, held that, although that day after the first Monday in
March of each year, on which the County Collectors' accounts are
audited and adjusted, "will become to such a collector practically the
end of the fiscal year for him, for all other purposes, the fiscal year by
the terms of the statute,"1 ended on the thirty-first day of December
preceding, and according to the agreed facts this warrant is not void."
And "in contemplation of law the revenues of the state for the year
past are to be in the hands of its officers, on or before the first day
of January of the next year. R. S. 1889, Section 7605." This language
can have but one meaning, namely, that the taxes levied and col-
lected in any calendar year, are the taxes of and revenue provided
for that calendar year, notwithstanding the assessment of property
on which they are based was begun, and such taxes became a lien
on real cstate when assessed and levied, as of June first in the pre-
ceding year.
In State ex rel v. Appleby, the ruling in the Knox County case
was followed without comment; but ;n State ex rel. vs. Allison, where
it was contended that the fiscal year of the counties commenced on
May first in each year, the court re-examined the question fully and
adhered to the conclusion it had arrived at in the Knox County
case. The decision was put upon the grounds, first: That the proviso
added to section 5370 in 1879 (§3166, R. S. 1889) to carry out the
constitutional restriction, to the effect that no warrant shall be paid
out of the county's revenue "for any one year" until the necessary
expenses incurred in maintaining the county for that year are paid,
30 Wilson v. Knox County, 132 Mo. 398; State ex rel. Vaughn v.
Appleby. 136 Mo. 408; State ex rel. Exchange Bank v. Allison. 155 Mo. 325.
31. Laws Mo. 1868. P. 178: R. S. Mo. 1889. Sec. 8589.
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must be read in the light of the further provision in the same re-
vision, "that the word 'year' shall mean a calendar year, unless oth-
erwise expressed," thus leaving "no room for construction as to the
meaning of the words 'for any one year,'" in the proviso first re-
ferred to; secondly, that since its amendment in 1868 to make the fiscal
year conform to the calendar year, the statute defining the fiscal
year applies to the fiscal affairs of the counties as well as of ±."
state; and that the legislative intent that the fiscal year of the counties
should be the same as that of the state is clearly shown by the changes
made in other sections of the statutes to conform them to that
intent.
That the court intended to and did decide that taxes under our
system are assessed for the calendar year followinf .he firt day of
June on which the assessment begins, dearly appears from the last
paragraph of the opinion, in which the court says. in answei to the
supposed difficulty or impossibility of conforming to the constitu-
tional mandate if the fiscal year and the tax year were identical:
"True, from January to May, one-third of the year, the county court
cannot know the exact amount of revenue that the taxpayers will
be called on to furnish. This uncertainty exists because the exact
valuation of the taxable property in the county is then unknown, and
the rate of taxation has not then been fixed, and yet expenses are neces-
sarily incurred in carrying on the county government and main-
taining its duty to the state. . . . Ordinarily there is not such a
difference between the aggregate assessment of the county for one
year, and the following as would put the county judges to sea,
and if any unusual event had taken place since the last assess-
ment likely to produce an extraordinary diminution or increase in
the value of the county's property, the county judges would be
apt to know it. The economic problem for them to solve is the
amount of indebtedness it will be prudent to incur for the county for
the county for four months in view of the probable income. As a
common sense business problem there is nothing very difficult about
it, and if the county judges are not to be accredited with sufficient
discretion to determine a matter of that kind, then our whole system
is wrong. The county court can keep safely within the constitutional
limitation, and follow strictly the provisions of the statutes, and still
count the fiscal year as beginning on January first, and ending Decem-
ber thirty-first."
If the decision in the De Giverville case is the law, then the dif-
ficulty which the supreme court speaks of in the foregoing passage
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would exist--not from January to May, as the court holds it does--
but only for a part of the month of May. Thus the decision of the
Supreme Court is clearly in conflict with the decision in the De
Giverville case, and must be considered as overruling that decision,
although, it was not expressly overruled or referred to by that court,
particularly so in view of the fact that the De Giverville case had been
pressed upon the court's attention in the earlier Appleby case and
had not been there followed by the court.
In the De Giverville case the court treated the terms "fiscal year"
and "taxable year" as synonymous; and, although prior to 1868 they
were clearly not synouymous, since the act of 1868 making the calen-
dar year the fiscal year of the State and Counties, they unquestionably
have been synonymous. And since 1875 the fiscal year and taxable
year must correspond in order to make the limitations of the Con-
stitution effective. The decisions of the Supreme Court above re-
ferred to squarely hold that the calendar year is the fiscal year for
the counties as well as the state, and also inferentially at least decide
that the calendar year is the tax year as well; and, as those decisions
are controlling, the rule announced in the De Giverville case that the
tax year begins with the assessment on June first and ends on May
thirty-first, shoeld no longer be followed.
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